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BEHIND THE SMOKESCREEN:
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING OF
MOBILE HOMES
SUSAN N. CHERNOFF*
I. INTRODUCTION
The desire to own a single family home is the essence of the Ameri-
can dream.' Dramatic increases in housing costs,2 however, are
preventing many potential buyers from investing in a conventional
site-built home.3 New homebuyers, seeking a more affordable alter-
native,' choose factory-built mobile homes5 as their permanent resi-
* A.B. Duke University, 1978; J.D., Washington University, 1983.
1. Tremblay, Dillman & Dillman, Acceptable Housing Alternatives, CHALLENGE,
Jan. 1981, at 25.
2. The average price of a new conventional home in July 1982 was $91,100.
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, NEW ONE FAMILY
HOMES SOLD AND FOR SALE, July 1982. The increase in housing costs is attributable
to rapid inflation, spiralling construction costs and high interest rates. Hill, Home
Builders Expect a Persistent Slump With a Slow Recovery, Shrinking Industry, WALL
ST. J. Feb. 8, 1982, at 27, col. 4.
For a concise description of the evolution of the American housing conditions and
economy, see R. FISHMAN, HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW 1-4 (1978).
3. D. MANDELKER, C. DAYE, 0. HETZEL, J. KUSHNER, H. MCGEE & R. WASH-
BURN, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 1 (1981). Although Americans as
a whole are better housed than ever before, the reality of high inflation and fluctuat-
ing mortgage rates overwhelms the low-income buyer. The costs of owning and oper-
ating a home dramatically outstripped personal income. As a result, many low
income families are priced out of the home ownership market. Id
4. The options available include mobile homes, other manufactured housing, see
infra note 5, townhouses or apartments. F. BAIR, REGULATING MOBILE HOMES 1
(1981).
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dence6 with increasing frequency.7 The contemporary mobile home,
5. A mobile home, as defined by the original National Mobile Home Construc-
tion and Safety Standards Act of 1974, is:
... a structure, transportable in one or more sections, which is eight body feet or
more in width and is thirty-two body feet or more in length, and which is built on
a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a
permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes the
plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical systems contained therein.
National Mobile Home Construction and Safety Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5402(6)
(1976).
In 1980, Congress amended the National Mobile Home Construction and Safety
Standards Act, and changed the term "mobile home" to "manufactured home." The
amended version of the statute defined manufactured home as:
a structure transportable in one or more sections, which, in the traveling
mode, is eight body feet or more in width orforty bodyfeet or more in length, or,
when erected on site, is three hundred twenty or more square feet, and which is
built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or with-
out a permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and in-
cludes the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical systems contained
therein; except that such term shall include any structure which meets all the
requirements of this paragraph except the size requirements which. . . complies
with the standards established under this title.
(emphasis added). National Mobile Home Construction & Safety Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. § 5402(6) (Supp. IV) (as amended).
These changes reflect the fact that the "mobile home" label has become less accu-
rate. For a more extensive discussion of this phenomenon, see infra notes 38, 39, 43-
85 and accompanying text.
A double-wide mobile home consists of two mobile sections brought to the site on
individual chassis, and attached horizontally on the site. B. HODES & G. ROBERSON,
THE LAW OF MOBILE HOMES 4 (3d ed. 1974). As of 1981, about 24% of total mobile
home shipments were double-wide units. Manufactured Housing Institute, Inc.,
Quick Facts, July 1982.
A modular home consists of one or more prefabricated sections combined on the
site to make a home. B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra. Modular housing must con-
form with state and local regulations, in contrast to mobile homes which must also
adhere to the federal regulations discussed here. Nutt-Powell, Mobile Homes are Get-
ting Classier, 48 PLANNING 20, 20 (1982).
Both modular homes and mobile homes can be accurately described by the generic
term "manufactured housing," e.g., housing that is built in a factory as opposed to site
built housing. In the context of this Note, all references to manufactured housing
imply only mobile homes, unless otherwise specified. For an up-to-date and compre-
hensive analysis of contemporary manufactured housing, including the construction,
marketing, quality, and financing of manufactured housing, see generally T. Nurr-
POWELL, MANUFACTURED HOMES (1982).
6. In Gates v. Howell, 204 Neb. 256, 262, 282 N.W.2d 222, 26 (1979), a witness
stated that between 75 and 80 percent of mobile homes are never moved from their
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in contrast to its historical predecessor,8 is attractive,9 safe,' 0 and en-
original location. More recent sources contend that 97% of mobile homes remain at
their original site location. Nutt-Powell, supra note 5, at 21.
For a discussion of the treatment of mobile homes as permanent entities in other
contexts, see infra note 171.
During the Great Depression, trailer inhabitants had the reputation of being "foot-
loose, nomadic people unlikely to make any positive contribution to community life."
The use of trailers primarily by tourists and transient workers established this impres-
sion. Note, Toward an Equitable and Workable Program of Mobile Home Taxation,
71 YALE L.J. 702, 703-04 (1962). In contrast, mobile homes today are purchased pri-
marily by young families, the elderly and childless couples. Nutt-Powell, supra note
5, at 21. See also THE CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY, MOBILE HOMES, THE Low COST
HOUSING HoAX 14-15 (1975).
7. In 1981 manufactured homes comprised over 20% of new housing starts. Sell-
ing for an average price of $20,000, mobile home sales rose to 250,000 in 1981. This
represents a 13% increase in the number of units sold over 1980. Nutt-Powell, supra
note 5, at 23. In 1982, over 90% of all single family dwellings sold in the United
States for less than $35,000 were manufactured homes.
As of November 1981, the cost of a double-wide manufactured home with three
bedrooms and 2 baths, measuring 1,152 square feet included:
Retail price of basic unit ($19.80 per sq. foot) $22,810
Transportation (35 mi. at $2 per mile per section) 1,400
Unit set-up ($30 per hour, two-person crew, 16 hrs) 480
Land purchase and preparation 7,000
Total $31,690
Id at 21.
Between the years 1974-1979, mobile home size increased by 15%, while total cost
of the mobile home grew by 80%. During the same time period, the average size of a
conventional home grew by 1.8% while the total cost grew by 87%. These statistics
illustrate what is considered the single most important feature of new manufactured
housing: the price advantage. Lightbody, Manufactured Homes: Beating the High
Cost of Housing, CONSUMERS DIG. July/Aug. 1981 reprinted in T. NtTT-POWELL,
MANUFACTURED HOUSING: A LOOK AT THE ISSUES 19-20 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
MANUFACTURED HOUSING].
8. The economic conditions of the Depression followed by a severe post-war
housing shortage forced thousands of flimsy trailers into use as permanent housing.
Describing the mobile homes of this era, one author stated that:
.. .Often these units were without running water or sanitary facilities. There
were no construction standards to insure even minimum protection against fire or
collapse. They were parked in areas which were usually crowded, poorly
equipped, and generally unsuited to residential use. As a result, conditions in
these parks seldom exceeded minimum health and sanitation standards. The
specter of such parks teeming with tiny trailers made community apprehension
understandable.
Note, supra note 6, at 702-3.
9 Brief of Manufactured Housing Institute, Inc., Amicus Curiae at 4, Robinson
Township v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Robin-
son Amicus Brief]. The modem mobile home, with proper landscaping and skirting,
1983]
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can be as attractive as site-built housing. Many mobile home owners add additional
rooms, carports, porches and decks to the initial unit. The interiors of modem mobile
homes bear very little similarity to former travel trailers. Mobile homes commonly
contain all the modem household conveniences in addition to amenities such as ca-
thedral ceilings, atriums, panelling and built-in furniture. Id at 4-5.
New mobile homes are usually sold fully equipped with major appliances, furni-
ture, draperies, lamps and carpeting included in the purchase price. The optional
features include air conditioning, automatic dishwashers, garbage disposals, trash
compactors and central vacuuming systems. Manufactured Housing Institute, Inc.,
Quick Facts, July, 1982.
But see Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 313, 302 N.W.2d 146, 150(1981). The Robinson court stated: "To be sure, mobile homes inferior in many re-
spects to site-built homes continue to be manufactured." Id.
10. Nutt-Powell, supra note 5, at 21. After passage of the National Mobile Home
Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5425 (1976), as
amended by Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-128, 91
Stat. 1149, all mobile homes produced must meet the detailed requirements of the
Mobile Home Construction and Safety Standards, 24 C.F.R. §§ 3280.1-.904 (1983).
The Act covers every facet of mobile home production and use. The purpose of the
Act is "to reduce the number of personal injuries and deaths and the amount of insur-
ance costs and property damage resulting from mobile home accidents and to im-
prove the quality and durability of mobile homes." 42 U.S.C. § 5401 (1976). The
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) monitored the regulatory
impact on structural safety and durability of mobile homes. Research indicated that
mobile home standards equal or surpass those required of site-built housing. Nutt-
Powell, supra note 5, at 21. The HUD research stated the following:
The mobile home from an engineering point of view, is a more sophisticated
structure than the conventional home. It is engineered to satisfy the same load-
ing conditions of a conventional home while selling at a fraction of the cost. At
the same time, it must meet the greater, sharper, and unpredictable, dynamic
conditions caused by over-the-road movement...
.. . The claim that the mobile home is of inferior construction is not justified
, * * Mobile home design principles are more efficient than those used in the
structural design of the conventional home.
D. BERNHARDT, STRUCTURE, OPERATION, PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
TRENDS OF THE MOBILE HOME INDUSTRY 86, 93 (unpublished study for the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development) reprinted in Robinson Amicus Brief, supra
note 9, at 22-23.
The National Mobile Home Construction and Safety Standards Act provides for an
elaborate federal enforcement system. Manufactured home designs must be ap-
proved by HUD's design approval inspection agency and during one stage of produc-
tion by an in plant inspection agency. Individual state agencies monitor compliance
with HUD's standards. Those agencies are in turn monitored by a National Confer-
ence on States and Building Codes.
In contrast, site-built homes are controlled by both state and federal building code
standards. The standards may not be consistent with the standards imposed by local
inspectors in monitoring compliance. In addition, as technology changes, revisions
are not made uniformly throughout the country. Rather, changes are made on the
state and local levels, leaving open possibilities for wide variation, in addition to lags
or delays in implementing those changes. Unpublished Comments on Behalf of Man-
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ergy efficient. " Despite these innovations, the technological modern-
ization of mobile homes has not been accompanied by a comparable
development in zoning treatment. 2 Municipal zoning provisions
ufacturers on Manufactured Housing Standards Revisions Submitted for Office of
Management & Budget Review by Casey, Scott and Canfield, P.C., 19-20 [hereinafter
cited as Unpublished Comments on Behalf of Manufacturers of Manufactured Hous-
ing].
The most common hazards of mobile homes include flammability and susceptibil-
ity to strong winds. The mobile homes built to HUD Code standards have shown
little vulnerability to these dangers. Nutt-Powell, supra note 5, at 21. For a detailed
analysis of the safety and quality of mobile homes, see MANUFACTURED HOUSING,
supra note 7, at 26-40. For a critique of the former hazards of mobile homes, see THE
CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 6, at 87-162.
In fall of 1982, Congress proposed numerous revisions to HUD's structural and
performance standards for manufactured housing. Although the manufactured hous-
ing regulations form one of the most comprehensive federal regulatory schemes, it is
financed entirely by manufacturers, As a result, the manufacturers are forced to pass
the costs of regulation on to consumers in the form of higher prices. This phenome-
non defeats the critical advantage of this form of housing while not significantly im-
proving the safety or durability of the units. Unpublished Comments on Behalf of
Manufacturers of Manufactured Housing, supra, at 48.
11. Nutt-Powell, supra note 5, at 21. The HUD manufacturing code, see supra
note 10, ensures that mobile homes are energy efficient by requiring heating, ventila-
tion and thermal envelope provisions, as well as use of exceptionally high grade insu-
lation. Additionally, the Code provides that homes located in certain states be
equipped with storm windows or insulated glass. 24 C.F.R. § 3280 (1982).
12. Bair, Mobile Homes-A New Challenge, 32 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 286, 290
(1967). Fifteen years ago, Bair recognized that zoning regulations were not respon-
sive to the needs of mobile homes. He found that although mobile homes are single
family residences, they were not permitted in most single-family residential areas. He
also found that the density requirements in many zoning schemes were unable to
accommodate mobile home parks. Id These zoning issues remain significant obsta-
cles to reaching the full potential of this important housing source. The two other
main problems in manufactured housing use, which have largely been overcome are
1) the negative image and 2) the lack of adequate home financing. Manufactured
Housing Institute Unpublished Commentary (April 1982).
Even though increased demand for mobile homes has resulted from both improve-
ments in the product and a competitive price, zoning laws show continuing evidence
of discrimination against manufactured housing. In April 1982 the President's Com-
mission on Housing stated that
.. . [mlanufactured housing can be as safe and healthy as comparable site-built
housing. Housing systems or components satisfying a nationally recognized
model code similarly should not be excluded from use in a locality. Exclusionary
zoning provisions based on type of manufacture are arbitrary and unrelated to
legitimate zoning concerns.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING 203-4 (April 1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
Financing mobile home purchases was a major problem in the past because lenders
financed the homes as personal rather than real property. In 1981, however, the Fed-
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continue to embody the residual fears that mobile homes will blight
and burden the community. 3 Responding to these impressions, local
government often excludes mobile homes from entire municipalities,
prevents their presence in residential districts, or forces them into un-
desirable areas of the community.' 4
eral National Mortgage Association (FNMA) initiated a program whereby manufac-
tured housing loans were treated as real estate mortgages. Through this mechanism,
FNMA created a secondary market for manufactured home loans that created financ-
ing similar to that available for site-built housing. FNMA requires the manufactured
homes to meet certain guidelines:
(I) The unit must be permanently attached to a real estate lot, and wheels and
axles must be removed;
(2) The land and the home must be sold as a package and financed by a single
real estate mortgage;
(3) The mortgage must be covered by a standard title insurance policy;
(4) The mortgage must exclude financing of furniture--except kitchen and
laundry appliances, draperies, and carpeting-and any kind of insurance;
and
(5) The property must be comparable to site-built housing in the local
marketplace.
Federal National Mortgage Association News Release, August 6, 1981, reprinted in
MANUFACTURED HOUSING, supra note 7, at 77-79. In addition to the FNMA pro-
gram, HUD has also granted long-term mortgage insurance for new manufactured
housing. Manufactured Housing Institute Unpublished Commentary (April 1982).
13. Lightbody, supra note 7,reprintedin MANUFACTURED HOUSING, sUpra note 7,
at 16. Mobile home ordinances generally reflect attitudes that grew out of the Great
Depression era. Carter, Problems in the Regulation and Taxation of Mobile Homes, 48
IowA L. REV. 16, 17 (1962). Many communities fear that the trailers and their tenants
will bring with them three major problems: 1) depressed property values and neigh-
borhood blight especially in middle or upper class residential neighborhoods; 2) over-
burdened municipal services; and 3) socially undesirable people. Note, Mobile
Homes: A Partial Solution to West Virginia's Housing Problem, 81 W. VA. L. REV.
251, 252 (1979). See infra notes 24-42 and accompanying text.
Municipal services are affected because traditionally, high density mobile home
parks produce disproportionately low tax revenue compared to the costs they imposed
on the community. These costs include: The need for more school services and facili-
ties, additional capacity of public utilities, and increased police and fire protection.
Communities must assume the burden of providing these services. Moore, The Mo-
bile Home and the Law, 6 AKRON L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1973).
14. Note, Regulation ofMobile Homes, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 125, 125 (1961). In
1961, one commentator stated:
• ..some municipalities have responded to the social and economic problems
incident to the use of mobile homes by using their regulatory powers in a manner
both intolerant and hostile. They have imposed. . . burdensome requirements,
calculated to destroy rather than to regulate, and they have sought to confine
trailer living to "ghettos" in areas unfit for residential use ....
Id. Twenty years later, the President's Commission on Housing acknowledged that
discrimination against mobile homes still remains: "Despite the increasing attractive-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol25/iss1/6
MOBILE HOMES
This Note examines methods of exclusionary zoning affecting mo-
bile homes. As a threshold issue, the Note discusses the judicial and
legislative definitions of a mobile home. The analysis demonstrates
that the resulting characterization of the mobile home determines its
treatment under the zoning ordinances. Subsequent sections focus on
zoning methods that effectively exclude mobile homes from single
family residential districts as well as from entire municipalities. Fi-
nally, the concluding portions examine recent attempts to accommo-
date the modem mobile home, and suggest future implications.
II. THE ZONING POWER APPLIED TO MOBILE HOMES
Municipalities obtain the right to regulate mobile homes through
zoning by an extension of the State's police power. 15 This grant of
authority permits municipalities to design measures to promote the
general welfare and protect the public health and safety.16 When a
court evaluates a zoning ordinance, it initially identifies the purpose
of the regulation in order to determine whether it legitimately serves
ness of manufactured housing, local zoning laws continue to discriminate against mo-
bile homes. In many localities, mobile homes are segregated into special areas, often
in disadvantageous locations set aside as "trailer parks." COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 12. at 203.
15. 8 E. MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.32 (3d ed. 1976). Munici-
palities, having no inherent police power, have no inherent zoning power. States
delegate zoning responsibility to local governments either through explicit constitu-
tional provisions, see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1; PA.
CONST. art. IX, § 2; Wis. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (delegating the zoning authority to mu-
nicipalities via a Home Rule provision), or via enabling acts. The Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act of 1922, developed by the United States Department of Com-
merce, was adopted in principle by all the states. Enabling acts have three basic com-
ponents: a) the grant of authority to local governments to control land uses, densities
and dimensional requirements; b) the concept of the zoning district; and c) the outline
of zoning purposes. D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL
OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 217-222 (1979).
16. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). According
to the Euclid court, ordinances "must find their justification in some aspect of the
police power, asserted for the public welfare." Id.
The police power includes all laws which further the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare. A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 2.01 (4th
ed. 1982).
The concept of zoning "for the public welfare" is the subject of much criticism.
Because zoning is an inherently political process, the particular ordinances may pur-
sue goals such as controlling growth or reducing property taxes, at the expense of the
public welfare. Delogue, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must End. Sugges-
tionsfor Legislative and Judicial Responses, 32 MAINE L. REV. 29, 29-30 (1980).
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the public health, safety and welfare. 7 Goals which are traditionally
advanced by zoning ordinances include the separation of inconsistent
land uses;' 8 the preservation of land values;' 9 and the control of mu-
nicipal growth."z Recently courts have also found aesthetic2' and en-
vironmental preservation 22 to fall within the rubric of legitimate ends
of zoning. If the regulation seeks to serve a legitimate purpose, the
court then must determine whether it is rationally related to its stated
purpose.23
Traditionally the courts upheld ordinances which sought to protect
the public from the health and safety hazards supposedly attributable
to mobile homes.2 4 Additionally, the courts approved regulations
which sought to promote the general welfare by excluding mobile
homes on the grounds that they tended to overburden municipal
226services2' and deplete adjacent property values.26 These seemingly
legitimate zoning concerns are often mere smokescreens for an un-
derlying resistance to mobile homes on the part of municipalities and
the courts.
17. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
18. Id at 394. Euclid upheld the separation of residential, business and industrial
buildings as a means of promoting the public health, safety and welfare.
19. A. RATHKOPF, supra note 16, § 5.04.
20. P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND UsE CONTROLS § 4.01[3] Communities "time"
their growth to prevent overburdening public services and to avoid urban sprawl.
Courts uphold reasonable regulations if they are intended to promote orderly growth.
Id
21. A. RATHKOPF, supra note 16, § 14.01. Traditionally zoning restrictions based
on aesthetics alone were invalid. The modem attitude accepts aesthetics as a basis for
zoning if the restrictions are "reasonable." Id
22. Id § 7.03. The preservation of environmentally and ecologically important
regions has become a legitimate zoning purpose in some jurisdictions. 1d
23. Id § 3.04.
24. A. RATHKOPF, supra note 16, § 19.03.
25. Eg., Napierkowski v. Gloucester Township, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959).
In Napierkowski, plaintiff could not place a trailer on a piece of land outside a mobile
home park. The court stated that this prohibition was properly within the police
power. It promoted the general welfare ". . . by assuring that adequate provisions
are made for drainage, sewerage facilities, water and lighting of trailers. .. " Id at
497, 150 A.2d at 489.
26. Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 595, 180 N.E.2d 333, 336
(1962) (power to regulate mobile homes may be exercised to ensure no injury to the
investment in conventional homes); Napierkowski v. Gloucester Township, 29 N.J.
481, 493-94, 150 A.2d 481,487 (1959) (trailers may retard development of an area for
residential purposes).
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The underlying motivations of mobile home regulation can be said
to fall into two groups: the "shouted" reasons and the "whispered"
reasons.2 7 "Shouted" reasons are those justifications that courts and
legislatures openly announce as the legitimate basis for regulation. 8
Proponents of mobile home regulation claim that mobile homes over-
burden municipal services and fail to generate sufficient tax reve-
nue.29  They also claim that the unsightly and unattractive
appearance of mobile homes cause adjacent property values to
decline.3°
The traditional rationales for regulation no longer comport with
reality.3 ' They arise from collective memories of conditions which
existed during the Great Depression. In the early 1930's, mobile
homes, then called "trailers," were often poorly designed housing
units crowded into parks that lacked adequate plumbing and water
facilities.32 While modem mobile homes no longer support these
outdated perceptions, widespread belief in their continued validity
serves as the basis for excluding this form of housing.33
The "whispered reasons, 34 are those that cannot be alluded to
overtly because they do not support even ostensibly legitimate zoning
purposes. In the mobile home context, these reasons principally em-
body the underlying desire to exclude transients3 5 and other people
27. Cf Babcock & Bosselinan, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U.
PA. L. REV. 1040, 1059-72 (1963). In this article, Babcock and Bosselman analyzed
the ways municipalities dealt with integration of apartment buildings into suburban
communities. The authors discussed the resistance to apartment buildings in terms of
"shouted" reasons, "whispered" reasons and "subconscious" reasons. Two of these
categories provided an appropriate framework for discussing similar phenomena re-
lating to attitudes towards mobile homes in communities. See also notes 127-33 infra
and accompanying text.
28. Id at 1062.
29. See supra note 25.
30. See supra note 26.
31. See supra notes 9-11.
32. See supra note 8.
33. As early as twenty years ago, commentators recognized the changing quality
of mobile homes, and urged for more equitable treatment. Eg., Note, supra note 6.
34. Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 27, at 1068.
35. Note, supra note 6, at 703-04. Mobile homes were originally used by tourists
and transient workers. Id In Clackamus County v. Dunham, 282 Or. 419, 579 P.2d
223 (1978), the dissenting opinion stated that one of the major justifications for ex-
cluding mobile homes from residential areas was the transient quality of mobile home
dwellers. Id For further discussion of Clackamus, see infra notes 55-61 and accom-
panying text.
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of a lower socio-economic status from living in the community. 6
Clearly, these reasons are not and never have been accepted as legiti-
mate zoning purposes.37
In the 1980's local governments continue to exclude mobile homes
on the basis of rationales which are either unfounded in fact or pa-
tently illegal. The most common and effective method for exclusion
is the manipulation of the definition of mobile home.38 The language
in mobile home regulations often wholly misstate the realities of
modem mobile homes.39 In addition, municipalities have supple-
mented the definitional methods of regulation with specific zoning
techniques designed to isolate or totally exclude mobile homes.40
Notwithstanding the resulting inequities, courts traditionally have
upheld ordinances with incidental exclusionary effects under the
guise of promoting the local zoning jurisdiction's general welfare,
while also satisfying the communities' "whispered" desires.4 ' Al-
though exclusionary zoningper se has generally become less preva-
lent,4 2 mobile homes still remain susceptible to out-dated judicial
36. Id at 1069. Housing cost is the primary factor determining the social status of
the occupants. Cheap housing, like mobile homes, is likely to attract lower-income
groups. Id
37. A. RATHKOPF, supra note 16, at § 17.04.
38. See infra notes 43-85 and accompanying text.
39. Id
40. See infra notes 86-147 and accompanying text.
41. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indi-
gent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 788 (1969). This approach has been traced to Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). In Euclid, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of zoning. Id at 387-88. The Court prescribed a pre-
sumption of validity to zoning ordinances, declaring that courts should uphold zoning
measures unless they are clearly arbitrary or unreasonable. Id at 388. Euclid also
sanctioned the use of zoning provisions to separate incompatible uses within a com-
munity in the name of general welfare. Id at 390. For many years, courts relied on
this theory to uphold ordinances separating industrial from residential areas. Id at
394. Communities eventually extended the rationale to separate not only incompati-
ble uses, but to exclude undesirable uses as well. Developments in the Law--Zoning,
91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1629 (1978).
42. In the past eight years, four states have invalidated exclusionary zoning prac-
tices. The states are: Michigan: Kropfv. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215
N.W.2d 179 (1974) (complete exclusion of a legitimate use has a "strong taint of un-
lawful discrimination" and is presumed unreasonable); New Jersey: Southern Bur-
lington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713
(zoning must promote general welfare of more than the local jurisdiction), appeal dis-
missed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); New York: Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d
102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975) (excluding multi-family housing did
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attitudes.
not adequately balance the community status quo with the greater public interest);
Pennsylvania: Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977) (lim-
iting multi-family housing to 1.14% of land for development failed to provide a fair
share of land and unconstitutionally excluded multi-family units).
California, through legislative action, effectively prohibits exclusionary zoning.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 669.5 (West 1981). For a discussion of this approach to exclusion-
ary zoning, see Burton, Calfornia Legislature Prohibits Exclusionary Zoning, Man-
dates Fair Share: Inclusionary Housing Programs a Likely Response, 9 SAN FERN. V.
L. REV. 19 (1981).
These decisions force municipalities to adopt a broad notion of general welfare by
evaluating the impact of zoning decisions on the surrounding regions. In the context
of housing, this approach prevents local government from excluding low-income
populations from a region by failing to provide areas for affordable housing.
The Supreme Court, anticipating the circumstances which might call for a "fair
share" zoning approach that looks beyond the individual municipality, found in Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), that zoning could not be
used as a tool to construct isolated municipalities without regard for the changing
environment. The Court stated:
[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope of their
application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions
which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing
world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.
Id. at 387.
In the State of New Jersey, Justice Hall, dissenting in Vickers v. Township Com-
mittee, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), astutely analyzed the constitutionality of
exclusionary municipal ordinances. In Vickers, the New Jersey Supreme Court up-
held a zoning ordinance that totally excluded mobile homes from a developing mu-
nicipality. In his dissent, Justice Hall analyzed the problems of expanding suburban
areas. He recognized the shortage of low-priced housing. He described the commu-
nity's use of zoning procedures to exclude low income people now and in the future
by banning mobile homes from a sparsely populated township. By upholding an or-
dinance which clearly erects barriers to low income families, the dissent contended
that the majority over-extended the ordinance's presumption of validity. Id at 252-
270, 181 A.2d at 140-150. Justice Hall recommended that the concept of "general
welfare" has some limit. He specifically advocated a scope of judicial review encom-
passing more than local concerns. Id at 260, 181 A.2d at 144. For an excellent dis-
cussion of Vickers, see Comment, Zoning-Townships-Complete Exclusion of Trailer
Camps and Parks, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1010 (1963).
The Vickers dissent became the basis for New Jersey's landmark case Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713,
appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). In Mi. Laurel the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that a municipality may not use its land use control mechanisms to make it
economically or physically impossible to provide low and moderate income housing.
The Mi. Laurel ordinance permitted only single family homes, and imposed such a
large minimum lot size that most moderate income families were unable to move
there. M. Laurel not only held that these zoning practices did not promote the gen-
eral welfare, but it also imposed a duty on municipalities to provide a choice of hous-
ing opportunities for various income levels. The court required the communities to
provide these opportunities to the extent of the municipalities' "fair share of the pres-
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III. THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM: WHAT IS A MOBILE HOME?
While most municipal zoning ordinances provide for mobile home
parks, the ordinances generally are ambiguous as to whether mobile
ent and prospective regional need. . .". Id at 174, 336 A.2d at 724. Mt. Laurel
therefore established the first explicit notions of "fair share" and "regionalism." In
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192
(1977), the court expanded Mt. Laurel, by specifying that communities must not only
provide for their "fair share" of housing, but that the community must also permit a
form of "least cost" housing (e.g., mobile homes).
In New York, the court adopted a different notion of fair share. In Berenson v.
Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975), the
New York Court of Appeals established a two-part test which it applied to determine
the validity of an ordinance excluding multi-family housing. The Berenson test ana-
lyzes 1) whether the community has a well-ordered and properly balanced plan and
2) whether the plan considers the needs of the region as well as the town for housing.
1d at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81. See Mallach, Exclusionary
Zoning Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 9 REAL EsT. L.J. 275, 291-92 (1981).
The Berenson test is satisfied if another neighboring community meets the regional
needs, as long as the community wishing to exclude the housing conducts the inquiry.
In Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Incorp. Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414
N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981), the Court of
Appeals found that a zoning ordinance enacted with an exclusionary purpose would
be invalidated. If it ignored regional needs or had an unjustifiable exclusionary effect,
the court will also hold it invalid. In New York, however, the burden of establishing
the exclusionary effect remains with the plaintiffs. P. ROHAN, supra note 20, at
§ 2.01[61.
In Pennsylvania, Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977),
adopted the "fair share" test. Surrick stated that the fair share principle requires local
government to plan and provide for the legitimate needs of all the categories of peo-
ple who might live in the community. 476 Pa. at 188, 382 A.2d at I 1. See Mallach,
supra, at 290-91. For additional discussion of the Pennsylvania cases, see supra notes
92-97 and accompanying text.
In Michigan, prior to 1974, the courts adopted a doctrine of preferred uses. Mobile
homes, along with hospitals, schools, churches, public utilities and mineral resources
had been granted this status because the public interests served by these institutions
required special protection under zoning laws. The preferred use doctrine, estab-
lished in Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971),
holds that the municipality bears the burden of justifying the validity of any ordi-
nance excluding a preferred use. The municipality must sustain a heavy burden of
proof, unlike the usual presumption of validity given to the ordinances. In 1975, the
Michigan Supreme Court reversed one aspect of Bristow in Kropf v. City of Sterling
Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974), by destroying the preferred use doc-
trine in cases of total exclusion. In Kropf, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the
total exclusion of multi-family units should be presumed unreasonable. Kropf also
reversed the burden of proof, requiring the plaintiff to show that the ordinance was
excusionary. Id at 156, 215 N.W.2d at 189 (1974). For further discussion of the
Michigan "preferred use" doctrine, see Comment, The Michigan Preferred Use Doc-
trine as a Strategy for Regional Low-Income Housing Development: A Progress Re-
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homes may locate in single-family residential districts.4 3 For a lim-
ited period of time, mobile homes possess characteristics of both a
vehicle and a home." When an individual attempts to place a mobile
home on a lot in a single-family residential area, the courts must de-
termine which feature predominates.45 Identifying the mobile home
either as a temporary vehicle or a permanent home often determines
its fate under the local ordinance.46
Because each ordinance characterizes mobile homes uniquely, the
judicial responses to mobile home designations do not fall into clear
patterns. 47 Nevertheless, the cases do reflect distinct and recurring
issues. Early decisions focused on the physical differences between
port. 8 URB. L. ANN. 207 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Comment, The Michigan
Preferred Use Doctrine); Casenote, 52 J. URB. L. 363 (1974).
For a discussion of the "fair share" principle and its development in the context of
exclusionary zoning, see Developments in the Law--Zoning, supra note 41, at 1624-59;
and Bums, Class Struggle in the Suburbs. Exclusionary Zoning Against the Poor, 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 179 (1975).
43 See, e.g., Douglass Township v. Badman, 206 Pa. Super. 390, 213 A.2d 88
(1965). The ordinance defined mobile home as "any portable structure or vehicle
. Id at 391, 213 A.2d at 89. The issue presented by Douglass is whether a
mobile home is "portable" when it has been attached to a permanent foundation.
Because the town could not prove that a mobile home attached to a permanent foun-
dation is a mobile rather than afixed dwelling, the court permitted the home to locate
in a single family residential area. Id
44, B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note 5, at 45. A mobile home could be
characterized as a vehicle because it has wheels which enable it to be towed on a
highway. Functionally, mobile homes are permanent housing, particularly when re-
moved from the wheels, anchored to the ground and equipped with utility connec-
tions. Id
45. D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 107 (1982).
46. Comment, Mobile Homes in Kansas: A Needfor Proper Zoning, 20 KAN. L.
REV 87, 90 (1971).
47. Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes. Zoning and Taxation, 55 CORNELL L. REV.
491, 501 (1970). During the past 10 years, at least half of the cases ftom higher courts
characterizing mobile homes placed on their own foundations held that mobile homes
always remain mobile homes. The other opinions found either that a mobile home
should be treated as a conventional dwelling if it was on a permanent foundation, or
simply admitted that there might be a distinction for certain regulatory purposes.
"The variations [in these decisions] were not mere differences of judicial opinion.
They represented. . . interpretation based on definitions appearing (or not appear-
ing) in the ordinances involved." F. BAIR, supra note 4, at 3.
This definitional confusion has been reflected in the following books and articles
which deal with the issue: R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 14.03 (2d
ed 1976); A. RATHKOPF, supra note 16, § 19.02; Bartke & Gage, supra at 499-507;
Comment, supra note 46, at 90-96 (1971).
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mobile homes and traditional houses. 48 Emphasizing the inadequacy
of the housing units, the courts found the small size of the trailers, the
poor construction, and the lack of basic facilities constitute health
and safety hazards.49 Recent decisions analyze the character of a
mobile home either by determining its status at the time of manufac-
ture or by considering the mobile home's construction and ultimate
use." Those decisions choosing the first approach rarely conclude
that a mobile home is a dwelling, while the cases following the latter
scheme generally find that mobile homes are, in fact, dwellings.
A. Mobility at the Time of Manufacture
Mobile homes typically leave the manufacturer towed on a chassis
equipped with wheels." Upon arrival at the chosen site, most owners
remove the wheels, and attach the unit to a permanent foundation.52
Formerly, courts agreed that an owner's attempt to permanently inte-
grate the mobile home into the foundation did not relieve the unit of
its original mobile quality. 3 Courts also accorded little significance
to the degree to which owners succeeded in integrating their mobile
48. E.g., Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 594, 180 N.E.2d 333, 336 (1962).
The court found that the Manchester ordinance excluded mobile home units from the
definition of a dwelling. The court contrasted mobile homes as self-contained units to
the conventional houses appropriate for a single family residential district. Id
49. Bartke & Gage, supra note 47, at 501.
50. See infra notes 70-82.
51. B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note 5, at 1.
52. Id at 8. See supra note 6.
53. City of Oakdale v. Benoit, 342 So. 2d 691, 695 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (municipal-
ity's definition of "dwelling" specifically excluded trailers. Defendant's attempts to
make the mobile home permanent did not modify it sufficiently for it to "cease to be a
mobile home and instead [become] a single-family dwelling."); Wright v. Michaud,
160 Me. 164, 174, 200 A.2d 543, 548 (1964) ("Such a structure [a mobile home], how-
ever elaborately it may be constructed or equipped, does not lose its appearance as a
mobile home by becoming affixed to the realty."); Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass.
591, 596, 180 N.E.2d 333, 337 (1962) (Even if the trailer has been affixed to the land,
"[i]t looks like a trailer, has the qualities of a trailer superstructure, and has been built
as a trailer" and should be distinguished from dwellings); Courtland Township v.
Cole, 66 Mich. App. 474, 477, 239 N.W.2d 630, 632 (1976) (present mobility not re-
quired for a structure to be a trailer coach); People v. Clute, 18 N.Y.2d 999, 999-1000,
224 N.E.2d 734, 735, 278 N.Y.S.2d 231, 232 (1966), affig. 47 Misc. 2d 1005, 263
N.Y.S.2d 826 (1965) (once mobile, the structure remains a "trailer" regardless of the
manner in which it is affixed to a foundation); Gravatt v. Borough of Latrobe, 44 Pa.
Commw. 475, 476-77, 404 A.2d 729, 729-30 (1979) (mobile home can be excluded
from certain districts on sole basis that it travels to its site on its own running gear);
County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 169, 288 N.W.2d 129, 137-38 (1980)
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home.54
In Clackamas County v. Dunham," the zoning ordinance defined a
single family dwelling as "a detached building. . but not a trailer
house,"56 and a "trailer house" as ". . . a building designed in such a
manner that it may be moved from one location to another."57 The
plaintiffs transported their double-wide mobile home from the fac-
tory, and immediately placed it on a concrete foundation. 8 The Ore-
gon Supreme Court found that the home violated the single-family
residence ordinance.5 9 The court ruled that a building designed to be
manufactured for possible movement between locations met the defi-
nition of a trailer house." Focusing only on the original portability
of the mobile home as it left the factory, the court decided that any
later attempts to make the mobile home permanent would not change
the essentially mobile character of the unit.6
In Heath v. Parker,6" the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted a
less restrictive view in holding that mobile home limitations should
not apply to homes which are no longer mobile.6 3 Plaintiffs
purchased a residential lot and later placed a new mobile home on
(fact that a mobile home is anchored to the property by posts or on concrete blocks
does not remove it from the "trailer" classification).
54. In City of Oakdale v. Benoit, 342 So. 2d 691 (La. Ct. App. 1977), the court
stated that even though the mobile home had been mounted on a permanent founda-
tion and connected to public utilities, the home remained "capable" of being mobil-
ized again. The court held that the narrow width of mobile homes makes them
permanently capable of travelling on a highway. Id at 695. But see Anstine v. Zon-
ing Bd. of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33, 190 A.2d 712 (1963). InAnstine, the court stated
that a mobile home which had been attached to a permanent foundation was as
moveable as a conventional house. Id at 36, 190 A.2d at 715.
55. 282 Or. 419, 579 P.2d 223 (1978).
56. Id at 422, 579 P.2d at 224.
57. Id The statutory issue raised by this definition is whether "designed" implies
design for manufacture of the unit or design for installation of the unit. Id
58. Id at 423, 579 P.2d at 225.
59. Id at 426, 579 P.2d at 226.
60. Id Finding that "designed" meant "designed for manufacture, the court also
implied that a building which is a mobile home thereby remains a mobile home for-
ever. Id
61. Id at 426, 579 P.2d at 228. Two dissenting opinions recognized that the ordi-
nance, passed in 1960, did not apply accurately to modem mobile homes. They
found that the majority opinion perpetuates the myths associated with mobile homes.
Id at 428-31, 579 P.2d at 228-229.
62. 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 (1980).
63. Id. at 681, 604 P.2d at 819.
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the site.' After attaching the home to a permanent foundation, the
owners removed the wheels, shingled the roof and added a large
porch and garage. 65 A restrictive covenant 66 barred all temporary
structures from the subdivision, including trailers.67 The court held
that the unit's original mobility could not render the mobile home
"temporary" 68 within the meaning of the covenant. Finding the mo-
bile home substantially the same as a conventional single family
house, the court concluded that the restrictive covenant could not
prevent plaintiffs from living in their mobile home.69  Although
Heath involved a restrictive covenant, rather than a zoning ordi-
nance, the case clearly illustrates the modem judicial approach.
B. Ultimate Use
Perhaps the most sensible judicial approach to the definitional is-
sue focuses on the mobile home's ultimate use.7 ° In State v. Work,71
64. Id at 680, 604 P.2d at 818.
65. Id
66. In Heath, the mobile home definitional issue occurred within the context of a
restrictive covenant. Restrictive covenants are a form of private rather than public
zoning, commonly used in subdivision developments. A. RATHKOPF, supra note 16,
§ 74.01. Traditionally, courts have upheld restrictive covenants excluding mobile
homes because the mutually enforceable agreements are based on contract law rather
than on the police power. Comment, supra note 46, at 110-11. See also Moore, supra
note 13, at 19-21. Notwithstanding this distinction, Heath clearly indicates the mod-
em judicial approach towards treatment of mobile homes.
67. Id at 680, 604 P.2d at 819.
68. Id at 682, 604 P.2d at 820.
69. Id For a discussion of Heath, see Dean, "at is a Mobile Home? The Law
and Manufactured Housing, 86 CASE & COM. 10 (Sept.-Oct. 1981).
70. Comment, supra note 46, at 97. The following cases find that the mobile
home's ultimate use as a permanent residence eliminates any mobile qualities the unit
once had. As a result, the decisions hold that mobile homes were permanent dwell-
ings: Fedorich v. Zoning Bd., 178 Conn. 610,424 A.2d 289 (1979) (mobile home used
as a stable and lasting dwelling is not a trailer, but is a permanent dwelling); Your
Home, Inc. v. Portland, 432 A.2d 1250 (Me. 1981) (mobile home used as a residence
could come within definition of a dwelling if installed on a foundation); Cherokee
Village Membership v. Murphy, 71 Mich. App. 592, 248 N.W.2d 629 (1977) (mobile
home is no less permanent than other permanent pre-built dwellings); Hume Village
v. Township of Middleton, 51 Pa. Commw. 465, 414 A.2d 768 (1980) (mobile home is
used as permanent living quarters, while trailers are temporary vacation homes);
Reed v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 31 Pa. Commw. 605, 377 A.2d 1020 (1977) (mobile
home permanently attached to ground was within meaning of "building"); Douglass
Township v. Badman, 206 Pa. Super. 390, 213 A.2d 88 (1965) (mobile home placed on
foundation is a fixed dwelling and cannot be excluded because it is "portable"); In re
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the Supreme Court of Washington inquired into the unit's character-
istics as a home rather than on vague distinctions between mobile
and immobile structures.72 In Work, the mobile home owner placed
his unit in a single family residential district. The home was attached
to a permanent concrete foundation and connected to public utili-
ties.73 The zoning ordinance defined a single-family dwelling as "a
building containing but one kitchen, designed and/or used to house
not more than one family . . . ."" Claiming that the definition of
"building" did not include "immobilized vehicles," the State argued
that the mobile home violated the zoning ordinance.75 The court
held that the unit's original mobility did not transform what is pri-
marily a home into a vehicle.76
Other cases distinguish mobile homes from sectional or modular
homes.77 A modular home consists of several units, fabricated wholly
within the factory, and assembled on a single foundation at the site.78
After being placed on permanent foundations, mobile and modular
Willey, 120 Vt. 359, 140 A.2d 11 (1958) (when mobile home is attached to the land, it
ceases to be a mobile home and becomes a residence).
For cases treating mobile homes as a permanent entity in other contexts, see infra
note 171.
71. 75 Wash. 2d 204, 449 P.2d 806 (1969). This case was an appeal from a crimi-
nal prosecution for "unlawful habitation of a mobile home" in violation of a county
zoning ordinance. Id 449 P.2d at 807. Therefore, the court must sustain a greater
burden in finding that the defendant violated the ordinance.
72. Id at 207, 449 P.2d at 808. The court found it apparent that defendant's resi-
dence was a single family building. Any of the building's mobile features were those
of the home itself and not those of a vehicle. Id at 206, 449 P.2d at 808.
73. Id. at 205, 449 P.2d at 807.
74. KING COUNTY, WASH.. ZONING CODE, Resolution 18801.
75. 75 Wash. 2d at 206, 449 P.2d at 808.
76. Id. at 207, 449 P.2d at 809. The court clarified its holding by specifying that
the statute would bar an immobilized school bus-a vehicle-from serving as a resi-
dence. Id
77. Town of Helena v. Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 387 So. 2d 162 (Ala. 1980)
(modular home not a mobile home); Woodstock v. Boddy, 240 Ga. 477, 241 S.E.2d
236 (1978) (mobile home ordinance was unconstitutionally vague when applied to
module home); Your Home Inc. v. Portland, 432 A.2d 1250 (Me. 1981) (modular
homes distinguished from mobile homes on basis of chassis construction).
78. R. ANDERSON, supra note 47. § 14.15. B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note
5, at 4. distinguished module homes from sectional homes. A modular home is "a
factory fabricated transportable building unit designed to be used by itself or to be
incorporated with similar units at a building site into a modular structure. . ." while
a sectional home is "a dwelling made of two or more modular units factory fabricated
and transported to the home site where they are put on a foundation and joined to
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homes are often indistinguishable. 9 In fact, the only visible differ-
ence between the two homes is that a mobile unit has its own towing
apparatus,8° while modular homes have towing mechanisms which
are not an integral part of the unit. Zoning ordinances, however,
align modular housing with conventional housing more frequently
than with mobile homes.81 Similarly, courts express a decided pref-
make a single house." Id This Note discusses modular, prefabricated, and sectional
housing as one entity: "modular housing."
79. Lightbody, supra note 7, at 17; F. BArn, supra note 4, at 1; Robinson Town-
ship v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981). Mobile homes must comply
with federal construction standards, see supra note 10. Modular or prefabricated
housing is subject to state building codes. Because the state codes for prefabricated
housing closely resemble those for site-built housing, there is some sentiment that
modular housing is of superior quality to mobile homes. A comparison of state and
federal guidelines reveals that this perception is mistaken because the standards im-
posed by the Federal government often exceed those required by the states. Robinson
Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at 7.
The physical distinctions between modular and mobile homes become even less
apparent with the growing popularity of double- and triple-wide mobile homes. Both
types of manufactured housing involve similar concepts of units which are attached at
the site. See supra note 5.
80. Comment, Mobile Homes in North Carolina: Residence or Vehicle, 50 N.C. L.
Rnv. 612, 619 (1972). This comment argues that prefabricated and modular homes
do not remain vehicles simply because they were brought to the site by a vehicle, and
could possibly be moved at some future time. Id. In 1958 the Vermont Supreme
Court recognized this concept stating:
It is common knowledge that many homes today are of the "ready-cut" variety.
Small ones may be moved in a complete form to the lot upon which they are to
be situated. Others are brought to a site in pre-fabricated sections which are then
assembled together to make the complete structure. Presumably, they could be
disassembled and moved to another location without too much difficulty or dam-
age. But we doubt that anyone would contend they were mobile in nature and
not a house or building.
In re Wiley, 120 Vt. 359, 364, 140 A.2d 11, 14 (1958). See also Your Home, Inc. v.
Portland, 432 A.2d 1250, 1255 (Me. 1981) (the Maine State code distinguished modu-
lar homes from mobile homes solely on the basis of the mobile home having a perma-
nent chassis). But see Kyritsis v. Fenny, 66 Misc. 2d 329, 330, 320 N.Y.S.2d 702, 704
(1971) ("the concept of a mobile home is entirely different from that of a modular
home").
81. Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981). In
Robinson, the local bulding code provided for prefabricated or modular housing in
single family residential areas. At the same time, a local zoning ordinance precluded
all mobile homes from all areas other than mobile home parks. The Robinson court
found this distinction unreasonable because both types of housing "are 'movable or
portable' and may be similar in appearance and constructed of similar materials." Id
at 321, 302 N.W.2d 154. For a further discussion of Robinson, see infra notes 148-167
and accompanying text.
Town of Helena v. Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 387 So. 2d 162 (Ala. 1980). In
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erence for allowing modular rather than mobile homes in single-fam-
ily residential areas.8 2 The tenuous distinctions between the quality
and appearance of mobile homes and modular residences disclose a
basic inconsistency in zoning treatment.
C. Critique
A review of the court's analytical approaches reveals that
ambigious terms in the zoning ordinances leave the courts wide dis-
cretion for determining their application to mobile homes. Some
courts, finding the statutes unconstitutionally vague, have refused to
resolve these specific definitional issues.83 Of the courts addressing
the substantive issues, those relying on the characteristic of mobility
at the time of manufacture fail to recognize that mobile homes are no
longer mobile. The "ultimate use" standard provides a more effec-
tive approach. Although courts apply this standard with increasing
Helena, the court found that a modular home was not a mobile home. Because mo-
bile homes, and not modular homes, are prohibited by the ordinance, the modular
home was permitted in a single family residential district. Id
In Kyritsis v. Fenny, 66 Misc. 2d 329, 320 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1971), the ordinances
reflected the divergent attitudes toward mobile and modular housing. The local ordi-
nance defined a mobile home as:
Any vehicle or similar portable structure with or without a foundation or wheels,
I . . designed or constructed to be towed, driven or otherwise transported to its
resting site and which is further designed to permit occupancy for dwelling or
sleeping purposes...
Id. at 329, 320 N.Y.S.2d 703. The Kryitsis court found that modular housing fell
within the following definition:
Dwelling: A detached building, designed or used exclusively as living quarters
for one or more families; the term shall be deemed to include automobile court
. . or. . . mobile home trailer...
Id at 329-30, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 703-4.
82. See, e.g., Town of Helena v. Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 387 So. 2d 162
(Ala. 1980) (modular home would not violate an ordinance prohibiting mobile
homes); Kyritsis v. Fenny, 66 Misc. 2d 329, 320 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1971) (modular home
which was indistinguishable from site built housing did not fall within ordinance
prohibiting mobile homes). See also F. BAIR, supra note 4, at 1 (manufactured hous-
ing other than mobile homes has with few exceptions disappeared from zoning con-
cern). But see Warren v. Town of Gorham, 421 A.2d 624 (Me. 1981) (ordinance
requiring modular home to be placed only in mobile home park upheld).
83. See City of Woodstock v. Boddy, 240 Ga. 477, 241 S.E.2d 236 (1978) (ordi-
nance defining mobile home only as a "vehicle or portable structure used for dwelling
or sleeping purposes" was unconstitutionally vague); Grant County v. Bohne, 89
Wash. 2d 953, 956, 577 P.2d 138, 139 (1978) (ordinance providing that no building
could be "moved in on any lot in the district" was unconstitutionally vague).
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frequency, its use is limited in some circumstances by a failure to
acknowledge the similarities between mobile and modular housing.
Generally, ordinances defining mobile homes as anything other
than a conventional dwelling provide merely a convenient opportu-
nity for underlying exclusionary effects. Zoning ordinances should
include precise definitions which accommodate the qualities and uses
of the contemporary mobile homes. A successful scheme might
adopt a broad definition of permissible housing applicable to all
types of manufactured housing including modular housing.84 The
ordinance might also separate mobile homes into classes according to
their specific physical attributes.8 5 Distinguishing between types of
mobile homes would permit residential areas continued control over
the appearance and quality of the manufactured housing as they now
control all other housing. Moreover, this method would not allow
the exclusion of mobile homes based merely on semantic loopholes
found in vague ordinances. Neither would the proposed scheme per-
84. F. BAIR, supra note 4, at 3-4. Bair has proposed a generic classification "man-
ufactured building" which is "1.) mass produced in a factory; 2.) designed and con-
structed for transportation to a site for installation and use when connected to
required utilities; 3.) either an independent, individual building or a module for com-
bination with other elements to form a building on a site." Id
85. Id Bair suggests six classes of mobile homes with varying degrees of resem-
blance to site-built homes. Taking into account the fact that not all mobile homes are
alike, this scheme would encourage placement of mobile homes that most clearly re-
semble site-built housing in residential areas. Id Bair's six classifications include the
following:
1 . . I. Class A-New mobile homes certified as meeting the Mobile Home Con-
struction and Safety Standards of the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment and approved as meeting "acceptable similarity" appearance
standards ...
2. Class B-New mobile homes certified as meeting HUD Mobile Home Con-
struction and Safety Standards, but not approved as meeting "acceptable
similarity" appearance standards.
3. Class C-New mobile homes certified as meeting [acceptable prior code or
codes], or used mobile homes certified as meeting either the HUD standards
specified above or such prior code, found on inspection to be in excellent
condition and safe and fit for residential occupancy.
4. Class D-Used mobile homes, whether or not certified as meeting HUD
prior codes, found on inspection to be in good condition.
5. Class E-Used mobile homes, whether or not certified as meeting HUD or
prior codes, found on inspection to be in fair condition.
6. Class F-Used mobile homes, whether or not certified as meeting HUD or
prior codes, found on inspection to be in poor condition and unsafe and/or
unfit for residential occupancy.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol25/iss1/6
MOBILE HOMES
mit "whispered" judicial attitudes to tacitly control whether or not
local ordinances permit mobile homes.
Solving only the definitional problem fails to ensure that mobile
homes will receive appropriate zoning treatment. Municipalities still
control the use and placement of mobile homes through exclusionary
zoning techniques.
IV. EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
Mobile home ordinances, like other zoning provisions, tradition-
ally carry a presumption of validity.86 In deference to this underlying
presumption, courts generally uphold ordinances which reasonably
promote the public welfare. 7 This judicial attitude enables legisla-
tures to impose a limited degree of restriction on particular uses of
land. Courts in several states have invalidated as unreasonable regu-
lations explicitly and wholly excluding a legitimate land use.8" These
decisions arise from ordinances which do not specifically exclude mo-
bile homes. Rather, they comprehensively exclude many legitimate
land uses. When an ordinance totally excludes an otherwise legiti-
mate use, courts closely scrutinize the measure and its effect on the
community.89 Nevertheless, local governments may still achieve to-
tal or partial exclusion of a particular use through indirect means.90
86. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
87. Id
88. See supra note 42.
89. Kropfv. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974). For
a discussion of the Michigan cases on exclusionary zoning, see supra note 42; see gen-
erally Burns, supra note 42; Comment, The Michigan Preferred Use Doctrine, supra
note 42; Comment, The Presumption of Validity, of Mobile Homes as a Preferred Use, 7
URB. L. ANN. 296 (1974); Casenote, 52 J. URB. L. 363 (1974).
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A,2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). For a discussion of the New
Jersey cases on exclusionary zoning, see supra note 42.
Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977). For a discussion
of Pennsylvania cases on exclusionary zoning, see supra note 42. See also Brower.
Courts Move Toward Redefinition of General Welfare, 31 LAND USE L. & ZONING
DIG. (1979).
90. Although Euclid did not intend to condone exclusionary zoning, 272 U.S. at
390, the concept of general welfare has expanded to such an extent that exclusionary
techniques have been justified. See Sager, supra note 41, at 784-800 for an analysis of
the development of exclusionary zoning.
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A. Total Exclusion from the Community
1. Explicit Exclusion
Among the states which have invalidated exclusionary zoning
practices," only Pennsylvania has specifically struck down a total
ban on mobile homes. In Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board,92 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced its exclusionary zoning doc-
trine in a case involving the exclusion of multi-family dwellings.93
The court held that a municipality may not ignore the needs of the
region by excluding low-income housing.94 As a result, Surrick re-
quires local government units to provide from the legitimate housing
needs of those people who want to live within its boundaries.95 The
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Courts96 subsequently extended Sur-
rick to the mobile home context. The Pennsylvania cases consistent-
ly find that under the Surrick standard, a community-wide ban on
mobile homes is unconstitutional.97
The Surrick court cited with approval the seminal decision of
91. See supra notes 42 and 89.
92. 476 Pa. 182, 383 A.2d 105 (1977).
93. Surrick was based on an earlier Pennsylvania case also dealing with apart-
ment building exclusion. In Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), a
zoning ordinance completely excluded apartment buildings from the community
based on the notion that apartments would burden the municipal services. The court
invalidated the ordinance because the community was resisting the responsibilities of
providing adequate housing opportunities in a developing community, id at 239, 263
A.2d at 397. Because the Girsh opinion did not provide specific advice on dealing
with this type of exclusionary zoning, Surrick has become the leading authority. D.
MANDELKER, supra note 45, at 106.
94. 476 Pa. at 192-94, 383 A.2d at I11.
95. Id. The Surrick analysis required the court to consider the extent of the exclu-
sion by identifying the proportion of land available for multi-family dwellings avail-
able to total undeveloped land in the community. Id
96. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court is one of two intermediate courts in
Pennsylvania. The Commonwealth courts are authorized by PA. CONST. art. 5, § 4
and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., §§ 761-764 (Purdon 1981).
97. Meyers v. Board of Supervisors, 38 Pa. Commw. 578, 394 A.2d 669 (1978)
(mobile home parks are legitimate uses which cannot be excluded from a township);
McKee v. Township of Montgomery, 26 Pa. Commw. 487, 364 A.2d 775 (1976) (ban-
ning mobile homes from entire township presumptively invalid); Board of Supervi-
sors v. Moland Dev. Co., 19 Pa. Commw. 207, 339 A.2d 141 (1975) (banning mobile
homes from entire town is presumptively invalid); East Pikeland Township v. Bush
Bros., Inc., 12 Pa. Commw. 207, 339 A.2d 141 (1974) (banning mobile homes from
entire town is presumptively invalid).
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Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel.98 In
Mi. Laurel, an ordinance barring-among other things-all mobile
homes from the township prevented the construction of a mobile
home park.99 The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the munici-
pality's duty to provide housing opportunities for people of all eco-
nomic classes.' ° The court instructed the town to make reasonble
housing opportunities, including mobile homes, available to all
classes of people. On remand, the New Jersey Superior Court, ac-
knowledging the development of attractive and well-constructed mo-
bile homes, found that such homes provided satisfactory housing for
low and moderate income families.' In light of these considera-
tions, the municipality could not justify the total exclusion of mobile
home facilities. Finding no legitimate basis for the ordinance, the
court held the ordinance exceeded the constitutional limits of the po-
lice power.10
2
De Facto Exclusion
In addition to ordinances which explicitly exclude mobile homes
from the community, many municipalities have ordinances that indi-
rectly achieve similar results. Although facially valid, these ordi-
nances have an exclusionary effect when applied to a specific
situation. 10 3
98. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
99. ld at 163, 336 A.2d at 719.
100. 1d at 174, 336 A.2d at 732.
101. 161 N.J. Super. 317, 357-59, 391 A.2d 935, 955 (1978). This case is the lower
court remand considering the extent to which Mt. Laruel complied with the fair share
duty imposed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the 1975 Mft. Laurel case, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
In the Mr. Laurel remand, 161 N.J. Super. 317, 391 A.2d 935 (1978), Davis Enter-
prises. a mobile home park developer, entered the suit. Davis claims that the exclu-
sionary ordinances and the township government prevented consideration of his
petition to construct a mobile home park. Id
102. 161 N.J. Super. at 359-60, 391 A.2d at 957. The 1978 M. Laurel decision
was appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court in response to plaintiffs' allegations
that Mt. Laurel has not met the requirements of the 1975 decision. Burton, supra note
42, at 22. In Mi. Laurel I1, the court upheld the prior invalidation of the mobile
home exclusion. The court, however, would not find that an ordinance totally exclud-
ing mobile homes is per se invalid. Slip Op., p. 123 (Jan. 20, 1983).
103, Numerous exclusionary zoning techniques operate to effectively exclude mo-
bile homes in particular and low income people in general. These techniques include:
large-lot zoning; minimum house size, bedroom number, or frontage and lot width
requirements; overzoning for non-residential uses; prohibition of multi-family hous-
1983]
Washington University Open Scholarship
258 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 25:235
In Meyers v. Board of Supervisors,"° the zoning ordinance both
prohibited mobile home parks and utilized a minimum lot size re-
quirement to effectively exclude mobile homes from being placed
elsewhere in the community.1"5 The township agreed to permit a
mobile home park, provided that the units met the density, lot size
and set-back requirements of the district in which the park was lo-
cated.' 0 6 The township's maximum allowable density restrictions
permitted 2.1 mobile homes per acre. 10 7 Holding that the lot size re-
quirement effectively excluded mobile homes from the township by
imposing unreasonable burdens on mobile home park development,
the court invalidated the ordinance. 0 8
ing; high subdivision requirements; and exclusion of mobile homes. R. FISHMAN,
supra note 2, at 54-56.
Large-lot zoning restricts development to dwellings on lots usually of acre or
more. This technique allows a community to limit the number of building sites. It
also keeps the price of the lots well above the range of low-income families. Mini-
mum house size limitations keep the housing costs in an area uniformly high. In
addition, minimum house size requirements can be tailored to exclude almost all
standard mobile homes. High subdivision requirements involve requirements that a
subdivision developer dedicate significant amounts of land for open or public space.
The developer, in turn, passes these costs on to the homebuyers, thereby raising the
cost of housing, and again excluding low income residents. Id For a discussion of
these and other exclusionary zoning techniques, see D. MANDELKER, supra note 45, at
109-11, 267-73 and Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary
Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 509, 520-522 (1971).
104. 38 Pa. Commw. 578, 394 A.2d 669 (1978). For a discussion of the Penn-
sylvania analysis, see supra notes 42 and 92-97.
105. Id at 580-81, 394 A.2d at 670.
106. Id.
107. Id at 583 n.2, 394 A.2d at 671 n.2.
108. Id at 585, 394 A.2d at 671-72. See also Board of Supervisors v. Moland
Dev. Co., 19 Pa. Commw. 207, 339 A.2d 141 (1975) (ordinance imposing minimum
lot size of 31,250 square feet excludes mobile homes and is invalid). But see Delaware
County Inv. Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 22 Pa. Commw. 12, 347 A.2d 513 (1975)
(zoning ordinance permitting mobile homes but requiring 20,000 square feet mini-
mum lot size not unconstitutional); Russell v. Penn Township Planning Comm'n, 22
Pa. Commw. 198, 348 A.2d 499 (1975) (15,000 square foot minimum lot size for mo-
bile homes not unreasonable, and therefore not defacto exclusion).
In Martz v. Butte-Silver Bow Govt., 641 P.2d 426 (Mont. 1982), the ordinance per-
mitted mobile homes on private lots in two residential areas. The majority of the land
in the two areas required one acre minimum lot sizes. Plaintiffs installed their mobile
home in an area not designated for mobile home use and when challenged, they con-
tested the validity of the ordinance. The district court found that the ordinance had
an unconstitutionally exclusionary impact on mobile homes because the practical ef-
fect was to exclude low and moderate income families, who could not afford one acre
of land. The Supreme Court of Montana was not convinced that the ordinance was
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Other municipalities exclude mobile homes by enacting ordinances
that approve that particular use, but zone little or no land for mobile
homes." 9 In Nicholas Heim & Kissinger v. Townshp of Harris,10t the
township provided for mobile home development on six out of 10,800
acres of privately owned land."' The court invalidated the ordi-
nance, holding that the token allotment of land did not mask an es-
sentially exclusionary measure.' 2 Similarly, in Smookler v. Townshp
of Wheaofeld,1 3 the local ordinance included mobile home parks as
a permitted land use classification." 4 Nevertheless, the provision ef-
fectively barred mobile homes because the township failed to zone
any property for mobile home development." 5 Although the ordi-
nance appeared facially valid, the court found that it arbitrarily ex-
cluded mobile homes from the township." 6
In addition to minimum lot size requirements and the failure to
zone a reasonable amount of land for mobile home use, municipali-
ties use other techniques to achieve a similar exclusionary effect.
Some rural communities impose time limitations on mobile homes,
preventing them from remaining in one location for longer than
exclusionary because the municipality stated that mobile homes meeting both HUD
standards, see supra note 10, and Uniform Building Code standards could be placed
m any residential area. The court remanded the case to determine whether these
requirements effectively excluded most mobile homes from the community. 641 P.2d
at 431.
109. This technique is commonly known as a "floating zone." See, e.g., Rodgers
v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951) (floating zone used to
exclude garden apartments).
110. 31 Pa. Commw. 357, 375 A.2d 1383 (1977). For a discussion of the Penn-
sylvania analysis, see supra notes 42 and 92-97.
111. Id at 360, 375 A.2d at 1384-85.
112. Id at 362, 375 A.2d 1385. See also Nickola v. Township of Grand Blanc,
394 Mich. 589, 232 N.W.2d 604 (1975) (excluding mobile homes from all but .1% of
the township constitutes unlawful use of zoning power). But see Villa, Inc. v. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 57 Pa. Commw. 221, 426 A.2d 1209 (1981) (16.7% of municipality land
area available for mobile home park use not a defacto exclusion of mobile homes).
113. 394 Mich. 574, 232 N.W.2d 616 (1975). For a discussion of the Michigan
approach, see supra note 42.
114. Id at 579, 232 N.W.2d at 617. Although the township had created a trailer
park district, no land in the township was designated for this use. Id
115. Id
116. Id at 585, 232 N.W.2d at 620. But see Town of Windham v. Sprague, 219
A.2d 548 (Me. 1966) (town can limit mobile homes to mobile home parks even when
no land has been so authorized).
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thirty days.117 Other communities impose minimum building size
regulations for residential areas which mobile homes cannot meet. 1 8
The diverse array of exclusionary techniques available to municipali-
ties effectively eliminates the mobile home housing option from
many communities.119 When mobile homes are not expressly ex-
cluded, but are instead indirectly shut out by these de facto tech-
niques, courts have more difficulty overcoming the ordinance's
presumed validity.
B. Partial Exclusion: Exclusion from Specflc Districts
Given the widespread judicial disapproval of ordinances that to-
tally exclude low-income housing from a municipality, local govern-
ments control mobile homes most effectively by simply restricting
their locations. These ordinances frequently confine mobile homes to
designated parks or prohibit mobile home placement in residential
areas. 2" A majority of state courts uphold these provisions. 12' A
showing that the regulations are only tangentially related to the pub-
lic health, safety and welfare is generally insufficient to defeat the
ordinance's presumed validity. 22
117. Town of Pompey v. Parker, 53 A.D.2d 125, 385 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1976) (a mu-
nicipality may not wholly exclude mobile homes, but limiting mobile home permits to
1 year is valid), aff'dmem., 44 N.Y.2d 805, 377 N.E.2d 741, 406 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1978).
118. Currituck County v. Willey, 46 N.C. App. 835, 266 S.E.2d 52 (1980). In
Currituck, the court held that mobile homes are sufficiently different from other types
of housing to rationally sustain different requirements. The minimum size require-
ment imposed by the county permitted homes of 24' x 60' or larger. Id, 266 S.E.2d at
53. This restriction effectively excluded all but double wide mobile homes. N. WIL-
LIAMS, 2 AMERICAN PLANNING LAW § 57.34 (Supp. 1981).
119. The exclusionary techniques also maintain low density housing ratios which
elevate housing prices in the entire community, precluding low and moderate income
families from obtaining housing. R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY
ZONING 5-7 (1973). For a discussion of the impact of exclusionary zoning on housing
costs, see Mallach, supra note 42, at 298-303. For a contrary view, see Rose, Myths
and Misconceptions of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 99 (1979).
120. Although increasing numbers of mobile homes are appearing in residential
areas, the majority of mobile homes still exist in designated parks. Economic reasons
originally forced mobile home owners into the parks because owners could rarely
afford to buy their own land. Today many of the older parks have deteriorated, while
the newer or rehabilitated ones are quite attractive. Nutt-Powell, supra note 5, at 22;
Bartke & Gage, supra note 47, at 508-9.
121. P. ROHAN, supra note 20, at § 3.03[5] (1981).
122. Kolis, Citadels of Privilege: Exclusionary Land Use Regulations and the Pre-
sumption of Constitutional Validity, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 585, 586 (1981).
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1. Confinement to Mobile Home Parks
Municipalities originally justified restricting mobile homes to spec-
ified parks to ensure that the city could provide residents with ade-
quate utility services, and police and fire protection. 123 By isolating
the trailers in a park, either on the edge of town or in commercial
districts, the municipality also protected the community from the aes-
thetic and moral nuisances commonly attributed to mobile homes. 124
Recent cases sustain these exclusionary ordinances on similar
grounds. 125
The arguments presented in cases confining mobile homes to parks
are analogous to those made fifty years ago by legislators and courts
regarding the integration of apartment buildings into residential ar-
123. Carter, supra note 13, at 33-35; Moore, supra note 13, at 11-13.
124. Id
125. In City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982), plain-
tiffs challenged 2 ordinances regulating mobile home parks and restricting location of
mobile homes to designated parks. The Court of Civil Appeals, 616 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1981), found that the ordinance was an unreasonable exercise of the police
power because the sole public interest was the spacing between the septic tanks. The
Supreme Court of Texas reversed that decision based on the community's need to
provide police and fire protection, to regulate health conditions, and to provide serv-
ices such as water, sewage and lighting. Plaintiffs argued that the needs of mobile
home dwellers are no different than the needs of site-built housing residents. The
court did not find these arguments persuasive:
While we recognize the substantial improvements made in modem mobile
homes, we do not perceive the similarities between mobile homes and conven-
tional housing as sufficient to overcome the presumption of the ordinance's
constitutionality . . . [T]he inherent structural differences . . . make them vul-
nerable to windstorm and fire damage; and their mobile nature may lead to
transcience and detrimentally impact property values if scattered throughout a
municipality.
633 S.W.2d at 795.
In the following cases, the courts upheld ordinances limiting mobile homes to des-
ignated parks based on the ease with which the city could provide police and fire
protection, water and sewage services, and regulate health conditions. Village of Ca-
hokia v. Wright, 57 Ill. 2d 166, 311 N.E.2d 153 (1974); Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me.
164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964); State v. Larson, 292 Minn. 350, 195 N.W.2d 180 (1972);
Town of Stonewood v. Bell, 270 S.E.2d 787 (W. Va. 1980).
Communities also use the zoning power to limit the growth of mobile home parks.
See Begin v. Town of Sabattus, 409 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1979) (no rational basis for ordi-
nance limiting growth to 4 new mobile homes per park per year when there was no
limit on growth of conventional housing); Village House, Inc. v. Town of Loudon,
114 N.H. 76, 314 A.2d 635 (1974) (ordinance limiting number of new mobile home
parks not arbitrary); Town of Glocester v. Olivo's Mobile Home Court, 111 R.I. 120,
300 A.2d 465 (1973) (ordinance limiting number of mobile homes per park, but not
limiting acreage of parks unconstitutional).
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eas. The business of renting apartments is hardly distinguishable
from leasing mobile home sites in a park.'26 Yet apartments are
presently acceptable in residential areas' 27 while mobile home parks
continue to be frequently relegated to less desirable districts.
121
Communities resisted the integration of apartment buildings into res-
idential areas for decades.' 29 Fearing that multi-family dwellings
were sources of dirt, noise and congestion, as well as transient and
immoral tenants, the courts upheld the separation of single and
multi-family uses.'3 ' As the design of apartment buildings improved
and the suburbs began to develop, the skepticism dissipated, allowing
multi-family housing to become an important alternative in the hous-
ing supply. 131
The same fears that once motivated apartment exclusions have
similarly led to exclusionary attitudes towards mobile home parks.' 3 2
Communities have yet to recognize the similarities between apart-
ments and mobile home parks. As a result, the courts and the legisla-
tors continue to focus on the unique aspects of mobile homes rather
than on those characteristics which resemble more conventional
dwellings. The apartment analogy in particular could provide a val-
uable model for approaching the mobile home problem.' 33
2. Exclusion from Residential Areas
Communities exclude mobile homes from single-family residential
districts based on the belief that mobile homes are qualitatively dif-
ferent from and inferior to conventional housing. 131 Municipalities
claim that mobile homes destroy the aesthetic uniformity of the resi-
dential area,' 35 thus reducing the value of surrounding properties.' 36
126. Comment, supra note 46, at 96-97 (1971); Bartke & Gage, supra note 47, at
508.
127. R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, supra note 119, at 8.
128. Kuklin, Housing and Technology. The Aobile Home Experience, 44 TENN. L.
REv. 765, 793-94 (1977); B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, supra note 5, at 225-28.
129. Comment, A Survey of the Judicial Responses to Exclusionary Zoning, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 537, 553-57 (1971).
130. Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 27, at 1046.
131. D. MANDELKER, supra note 45, at 105-06.
132. See supra notes 8 and 130.
133. See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
134. Delogue, supra note 16, at 41.
135. Note, supra note 13, at 265.
136. A. RATHKOPF, supra note 16, § 19.04. See also Manchester v. Phillips, 343
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Although aesthetic preferences are one of the primary forces behind
objections to mobile homes, aesthetic considerations alone rarely pro-
vide a sufficient basis for upholding exclusionary zoning.' 37 Demon-
strating that the appearance of mobile homes diminishes the value of
surrounding properties, however, is sufficient to sustain an exclusion-
ary measure in some jurisdictions. 31
Finding these considerations persuasive, the Washington Supreme
Court in Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake 139 upheld an ordinance
excluding mobile homes from a single-family residential district. 40
The court based its decision on three factors. First, the court stated
that the structural qualities of mobile homes stunt the growth poten-
tial of a residential district because they depress property values. 14 1
The court's second consideration focused on an array of nuisances
attributable to mobile homes. 42  Finally, the court evaluated the
purely aesthetic qualities of mobile homes and concluded that the
Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962) (town can reasonably consider that mobile homes
are frequently detrimental to values of adjacent homes and that they depreciate the
amenities and appearance of a residential district); Napierkowski v. Township of
Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959) (there can be little doubt that the main-
tenance and use of a trailer in a particular locale would stifle development for resi-
dential purposes).
137. Rowlett,,4esthetic Regulation Under the Police Power The New General Wel-
fare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REv. 603, 605 (1981).
138. Gravatt v. Borough of Latrobe, 44 Pa. Commw. 475, 404 A.2d 729 (1979)
(because general welfare includes consideration of aesthetic and property values, ex-
clusion of mobile homes from residential districts is valid); County of Fayette v.
Holman, 11 Pa. Commw. 357, 315 A.2d 335 (1973) (aesthetic and property values
included in general welfare and can justify excluding mobile homes). It is interesting
to note that Gravatt was decided after Surrick, discussed supra notes 42 and 92-97.
Notwithstanding the Surrick rule, Gravatt upheld the exclusion of mobile homes be-
cause the evidence demonstrated the overall negative impact of mobile homes on
neighborhood real estate values. 44 Pa. Commw. at 478, 404 A.2d at 730.
But see Anstine v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33, 190 A.2d 712 (1963) (no
evidence proving that aesthetic quality of mobile home would injure property values
in surrounding area).
139. 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978).
140. Id at 32, 586 P.2d at 868-69.
141. Id at 29-31, 586 P.2d at 867. The court specified that the economic damage
results from the mix of mobile homes and conventional housing. Mobile homes lo-
cated in a special district would do no damage. Id
142. Id Some of the nuisances the court cited include minimum storage capacity
leading to excessive clutter, space needs which require additional municipal planning
for parking, and an increased need for other municipal services. Id
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mobile units did not suit the surrounding residential architecture.
143
Finding these factors reasonable and the mobile homeowner's evi-
dence insufficient to rebut the zoning scheme's presumption of valid-
ity, the court permitted the city to exclude mobile homes from
residential areas. 44
Although Duckworth represents the most common treatment of
mobile homes in residential areas, the quality and appearance of con-
temporary mobile homes enable them to compete successfully with
site-built housing on aesthetic grounds.14 - Nevertheless, aesthetic
regulations are inherently vague and subjective. 146 A court that
wants to strike down an exclusionary ordinance will find mobile
homes aesthetically satisfactory. More frequently, however, a court's
application of amorphous aesthetic standards leaves mobile homes
even more susceptible to "whispered" judicial whims.
3. Robinson Townsho v. Knoll: A New View
Municipalities in a large majority of states may adopt ordinances
which exclude mobile homes from single-family residential areas or
confine mobile homes to specific parks. 147 One court recently dis-
missed traditional biases in favor of a new attitude toward the con-
temporary mobile home. In Robinson Townsh v v. Knoll, 148 the
Michigan Supreme Court found that mobile homes do not differ
from other single-family homes in a manner which constitutionally
justifies theirper se classification as a different use.'4 9 Defendants
placed a mobile home on an 80 acre plot of land in Robinson Town-
ship four weeks after the township passed an ordinance confining
143. Id
144. Id at 32, 586 P.2d at 868.
145. See infra appendix.
146. Despite the growing acceptance of regulation based solely on aesthetics, not
all such regulations are valid. Courts find certain aesthetic regulations arbitrary or
discriminatory because they are vague. See, e.g., J.D. Contr. Corp. v. Board of Ad-
justment, 119 N.J. Super. 140, 290 A.2d 452 (1972). In J.D. the zoning ordinance
restricted the number of vehicles that could be parked in a certain area. Although the
restrictions served aesthetic purposes, the court invalidated the ordinance because it
was vague and indefinite when applied to specific housing contexts. Bufford, Beyond
the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority of Jurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic Regula-
tion, 48 UMKC L. REV. 125, 130 (1980).
147. See supra notes 120-46 and accompanying text.
148. 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981).
149. Id at 312, 302 N.W.2d at 150.
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mobile homes to designated parks. 5° Prior to enactment of the ordi-
nance, defendants installed a water and septic system on the prop-
erty, along with several other site improvements.' 5' Seeking removal
of the home, the Township alleged that the owner's placement of the
mobile home violated the new zoning ordinance.'5 2 The court found
no reasonable basis for the zoning restrictions as a valid exercise of
the police power.' 53 Dismissing the traditional arguments for confin-
ing mobile homes to designated parks, the Robinson court declared
the ordinance unconstitutional. 54
The court first dealt with the definition of a mobile home. The
Robinson Township ordinance defined "mobile home" as "[a] mova-
ble or portable dwelling constructed to be towed on its own chassis,
connected to utilities and designed without a permanent foundation
for year-round living as a single-family dwelling."' 55 Refusing to
limit its analysis to the character of the mobile home when delivered
to the site, the court emphasized that the ordinance applied only to
the existing conditions and uses of the home. 5 6 The court ruled that
a mobile home's potential mobility could not provide a sufficient ba-
sis for exclusion because once implanted, modem homes are no more
150. Id at 308, 302 N.W.2d at 148.
151. Id at 309, 302 N.W.2d at 149.
152. Id at 335, 302 N.W.2d at 161 (Moody, J., dissenting). The issue in this case,
as stated by the court was "whether any and all local zoning ordinances which do not
totally exclude mobile homes from a community but which restrict the location of
mobile homes to mobile home parks and subdivisions within the community are inva-
lid." Id
153. Id at 321, 302 N.W.2d at 154. The court found that there is no legitimate
police power purpose toper se restrictions on mobile homes. The restrictions would
only be justified if the mobile homes "fail to satisfy standards designed to assure that
the home will compare favorably with other housing that would be allowed on that
site . .. I" d But see City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.
1982), discussed supra at note 125.
154. 410 Mich. at 322, 302 N.W.2d at 155.
155. Id at 313, 302 N.W.2d at 151. The Robinson Township building code did
allow for prefabricated housing in single family residential areas, while the local ordi-
nance did not allow mobile homes. Id For further discussion of the disparate treat-
ment of mobile and prefabricated housing, see supra notes 77-82 and accompanying
text.
156. Id at 315, 302 N.W.2d at 152. A zoning ordinance's reasonableness will be
analyzed with respect to existing and not future conditions. Similarly, this restrictive
zoning ordinance must be analyzed in terms of its impact on the mobile home as it
exists currently on the site, and not to its method of arriving at the site. Id
19831
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mobile than small site-built houses.'5 7 The court also found that
neither the mobile home's chassis construction nor its temporary
foundation created conditions which the community has a legitimate
interest in excluding.'5 8 Based on these considerations, the court held
the ordinance's definition of mobile home invalid as arbitrary and
discriminatory. 15 9
The Robinson court recognized that characteristics formerly inher-
ent to mobile homes do not exist today and, therefore, that per se
exclusion is unreasonable. 6 ' Concerns about the health and safety
of mobile home living, as well as the transiency of mobile home in-
habitants no longer justify exclusions.' 61 Mobile homes sufficiently
resemble site-built housing, making blanket exclusions based on aes-
thetic objections unreasonable. 6 ' Limiting its holding, the Robinson
court specified that a municipality may validly exclude mobile homes
from residential areas only if the home fails to comply with the par-
ticular district's design standards. 63
As indicated earlier, courts have invalidated ordinances which to-
tally exclude mobile homes, whether they achieve that result directly
or indirectly.'" The ordinance challenged in Robinson limited mo-
bile homes to designated parks, thus accomplishing something less
than a total exclusion. 65 By invalidating this ordinance, Robinson
forces courts and legislators to look beyond the characteristics tradi-
tionally attributed to mobile homes. At the same time, Robinson per-
mits municipalities to control the quality, size and appearance of
157. Id at 314, 302 N.W.2d at 151.
158. Id Although Robinson Township had a legitimate interest in protecting the
health and safety of its residents, it could do so by requiring that mobile homes be
attached to solid foundations to prevent windstorm damage. Discrimination against
all "movable" dwellings, however, is arbitrary discrimination. Id
159. Id
160. Id at 316, 302 N.W.2d at 152.
161. Id at 317, 302 N.W.2d at 152. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
162. Id at 319, 302 N.W.2d at 153. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying
text.
163. Id at 321, 302 N.W.2d at 154.
164. See supra notes 86-119 and accompanying text.
165. 410 Mich. at 308, 302 N.W.2d at 148. The township ordinance providing for
mobile homes only in designated parks stated:
Mobile Homes-Where Permitted: Mobile homes are considered as dwelling
units and are not permitted as an accessory use to a permitted principal use and
are permitted only in approved mobile home parks.
ROBINSON TOWNSHIP ZONING ORDINANCE, § 307.1. Id
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol25/iss1/6
MOBILE HOMES
mobile homes that owners wish to place in residential areas.' 66
While some mobile homes may not survive this examination, Robin-
son established a uniform standard 167 equally applicable to all dwell-
ings in the residential area. The decision does not permit a residence
to be excluded simply because it is a mobile home.
V. CONCLUSION
Municipalities continue to subject mobile homes to severe and ex-
clusionary zoning restrictions. The Robinson 168 court has recognized
the disparity between the purported and actual reasons for mobile
home regulation. Isolating these issues, Robinson 169 illustrates that
courts must raise doubts about the legitimacy of mobile home exclu-
sions which are based solely on the label: mobile home. Modem
mobile homes have clearly demonstrated their ability to serve as per-
manent residences.' 7o In addition, the emerging concept of "region-
166. 410 Mich. at 321, 302 N.W.2d at 154. The community's ability to control the
quality, size and appearance of mobile homes may still leave legislators and courts
ample opportunity for use of exclusionary zoning techniques. See supra notes 91-105
and accompanying text.
167. Although the Robinson decision takes a significant step forward for mobile
home acceptance, it is still uncertain how it will apply to some of the new mobile
home concepts. The court holds that per se exclusion of mobile homes from other
than designated parks is invalid. One of the developing solutions for dealing with
modem mobile homes is the establishment of residential mobile home districts. The
question remains whether Robinson also prevents the development of special residen-
tial subdivisions for mobile homes.
The concept of mobile home developments and districts enables a community to
plan not only for its current low-income housing needs, but also for the future. The
American Planning Association devised a Residential Mobile Home District model
primarily intended for mobile home occupancy, either in special mobile home com-
munities (cooperatives), or on individual lots. F. BAIR, supra note 4, at 4-5, 19.
168. 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981).
169. Id
170. See supra note 6. Mobile homes should be treated as permanent fixtures, not
only in the zoning context, but in the tax and home financing contexts as well. If
mobile homes become a portion of the "primary housing market," mobile home buy-
ers will be making an investment that will not depreciate as quickly as it has in the
past. In addition, mobile homes could be insured as real and not personal property
which gives them a greater degree of permanence. Finally, the concept of mobile
home subdivisions, see supa note 168, and condominiums reinforces the permanence
of this housing source. Jaffe, Mobile No More, FoRBs, Sept. 14, 1981 at 140.
New Jersey and Nebraska indirectly treat mobile homes as permanent residences
through their tax laws. In 1979 the New Jersey Supreme Court in Koester v.
Hunterdon County Bd. of Taxation, 79 N.J. 381, 399 A.2d 656 (1979), held that the
similarities between mobile homes and conventional dwellings are sufficient to justify
1983]
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alism"''1 imposes a duty on communities to make low-cost housing
opportunities available to all citizens. These factors, combined with
a critical housing shortage, compel municipalities to integrate mobile
homes into the community through reasonable regulation rather than
subjecting them to total exclusion or segregation.
taxing mobile homes as real property. Similarly the Nebraska Supreme Court in
Gates v. Howell, 204 Neb. 256, 282 N.W.2d 22 (1979), refused to tax mobile homes as
motor vehicles because of their close resemblance to residences.
Eight states have passed legislation specifically aimed at treating mobile homes
more equitably. Vermont was among the first to enact legislation. The Vermont stat-
ute, enacted in 1976, provides that "no zoning ordinance shall have the effect of ex-
cluding mobile homes, modular housing, or other forms of prefabricated housing
from the municipality, except upon the same terms and conditions as conventional
housing is excluded." VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 4406(4)(A) (Supp. 1982). According
to the Vermont Agency of Development & Community Affairs, the intent of the legis-
lation was to remove "some of the legally questionable local zoning barriers to low
and middle-income housing and eliminate the resulting social and constitutional in-
equities against those who live in a certain kind and cost of dwelling." Among the
states that have passed mobile home legislation, Vermont most clearly reflects the
underlying policy concerns through its detailed provisions and explicit legislative his-
tory. California passed a statute in 1981 prohibiting local government from excluding
certified mobile homes from lots zoned for single family dwellings. The manufac-
tured housing may be subject to requirements applicable to all site built housing.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65852.3 (Deering 1983).
In March 1981, Indiana passed legislation providing that local ordinances must
"subject dwelling units and lots to identical standards and requirements, whether or
not the unit. . . is a manufactured home or some other type of dwelling unit." IND.
CODE ANN. 36-7-4-1106(b) (Bums 1982).
Nebraska passed legislation in May 1981 requiring at least one district in a munici-
pality and city to include both land zoned for mobile home subdivision, see supra
note -, and individually owned lots. The municipality may also develop reasonable
and necessary requirements of the site development for mobile homes in these dis-
tricts in accordance with local standards.
The New Hampshire legislation expressed many of the same policy concerns that
the Vermont statute addressed. The bill recognized the state's commitment to provid-
ing adequate and affordable housing opportunities. It prohibits municipalities from
excluding "manufactured housing completely from the municipalities, by regulation,
zoning ordinances, or by other police power." The bill also provides that manufac-
tured homes located on individual lots "shall comply with lot size, frontage require-
ments, space limits and other reasonable controls that conventional single family
housing in the same area must meet."
Minnesota has also adopted legislation prohibiting the exclusion of manufactured
housing that complies with all other relevant zoning ordinances. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.25(3) (West 1983). Similar legislative action has been taken in Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 19-2938 (1981) and Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.827 (West 1983).
171. See supra note 42.
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